ISWAP as a "Maker of Epic Battles" and propaganda during times of setbacks
ISWAP as a "Maker of Epic Battles" and propaganda during times of setbacks
The militants showcase attacks in Lake Chad Basin, blaming the lack of success on "spies".
On 6 April, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) published a new video titled “Makers of Epic Battles #6”. More than 20 minutes long, it captured the militant group in a series of attacks of a varied nature and type. The release came at an interesting time, during which the Nigerian Army launched a series of successful offensives against the group in different parts of Borno State. Because of this, ISWAP might have decided it was in its interest to show that it could still launch deadly assaults. However, same as all propaganda, it showed a very distorted picture.
The state of ISWAP in April 2022
Currently, ISWAP’s reached a crucial point. The continuing Army operations in Borno State made the group increasingly vulnerable. For the last couple of weeks, the Nigerian military has been attacking ISWAP’s bases all over the state under the name Operation Desert Sanity, beginning with Alagarno Forest in February/March. Later, the troops assaulted Sambisa Forest, the southern edge of Lake Chad, and just last week, the areas near Metele and Kangarwa.
The previous post on Chronicles of Lake Chad talked in detail about Metele. To read it, click here:
The military claimed to have overrun ISWAP’s bases in all those areas. It does not mean the insurgents will no longer have a foothold in those areas, though, mainly due to the soldiers’ continuous presence in such remote locations simply being untenable. For this reason, the army would withdraw, claiming a complete success of the operation, leading to the return of ISWAP, albeit weakened.
The military offensives also led to a significant increase in ISWAP’s attack claims. Before February, the number of claimed attacks in Nigeria was around 30-35. Since then, many more attacks can be observed, often as a direct response to the Army operations. In February, ISWAP claimed 52 different assaults, while in March, that number rose to 60, representing the highest kinetic activity in the group’s history. While this statistic has flaws, mainly because non-claimed attacks are not included, it deserves a mention that so far in 2021, Nigeria was the location of the largest number of attacks claimed by the Islamic State - 162 (as of 8 April).
At the same time, the lethality of those attacks decreased massively. A year ago, during Operation Tura Takaibango (which also targeted Alagarno Forest), the average number of people killed claimed by ISWAP was around two per attack. In August, it rose to almost five killed per attack. Currently, that number dropped to less than one per attack. Additionally, when reporting enemy casualties, many ISWAP claims only feature a standard phrase used when the operation fails or there is no confirmation of any kills - “several killed and wounded.”
An attempt at showing strength
Even in the face of those setbacks, ISWAP has previously tried to show that it is still well-armed and its soldiers have high morale. It was best evidenced in the aftermath of the official confirmation of the death of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi on 10 March. After this announcement, the provinces worldwide started publishing photo reports showing the fighters pledging allegiance to the new leader Abul-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi (no family relation between the two). They took different approaches - some by showing the number of soldiers in one place, some by showcasing the sophisticated weapons, and some by the number of cells operating (either released as one extensive photoset or as separate photo reports).
ISWAP (excluding the part in the Sahel, which by the next week will have been separated as Wilayah al-Sahel regardless) decided to showcase mainly the weaponry and vehicles, however, doing it by publishing several photosets from different parts of Borno - i.e., al-Buhayrah (Lake Chad, most certainly its northern side), al-Faruq (ISWAP’s name for Alagarno Forest), Sambisa Forest, the Banki area, and the Kirenawa area. Interestingly, the sizes of the groups, even though they were well-armed, were considerably small. One might wonder if the group was simply trying to showcase its geographic spread and the size of the group did not matter or was it a reflection of the difficulties from which it was suffering.
Notably, doing a similar thing as almost all provinces of the Islamic State, ISWAP reused those photos as a video of the cells’ pledges, adding a significant part at the end. Perhaps for the first time, it used a nasheed in Hausa, to which it added a very graphic “music video” and subtitles in both Arabic and English. It might not be easy to interpret it correctly. Still, it might seem that the group was not only publishing it - through the Central Media Office of the Islamic State - to the broader Arabic-speaking audience but also to those living in northern Nigeria and perhaps even its own soldiers, telling them to remain steadfast.
“Epic Battles” and the distortion of reality
Whether the release of the “Makers of Epic Battles” was scheduled for the beginning of Ramadan and coincided with all Nigerian Army offensives or was planned in recent weeks as a response and show of strength will never be fully known. Regardless, the choice of the operations is, without a doubt, very interesting. From the release, the viewer could see that ISWAP can launch many different types of attacks - i.e., direct gun assaults, ambushes, mortar and rocket shelling, IED, and even SVBIED (car bomb) attacks. This is reflected in reality, as out of all provinces of the Islamic State, ISWAP uses by far the most different TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures).
However, it seems that all operations depicted in the video were from at least a couple of months ago. This is nothing new, as ISWAP usually does not show very recent attacks - the period between them taking place and a feature in the video propaganda is usually quite long. This is a double-edged sword, though - while it gives lots of time for the editor to gather sufficient material (for ISWAP, sometimes even more than enough), in situations like this, it gives an impression that the group published the videos to distort the reality. First, though, we need to check the dates of the attacks shown in the release (possible through previous photographic evidence and knowledge of the past attack claims):
Buni Yadi - 26 December 2021,
Cross Kauwa-Mile Ninety - 12 August 2021,
“Boroso” (Borgozo?) - 29 November 2019 (!) (see below),
Mallam Fatori (rocket/mortar attacks - exact date unknown, possibly August 2021 (see below),
Maiduguri - 04 December 2021,
Kareto-Gubio road - most likely 08 August 2020 (!),
Mallam Fatori (second time) - 28 February 2022,
New Marte - 03 January 2022,
Mallam Fatori (third time) - 03 February 2022,
Chetimari (Niger Republic) - exact date unknown, possibly January 2022.
As you can see, even though the attacks are not super old (except for the one from the Kareto-Gubio road), they are not super recent either. In some instances, it was challenging to give the exact dates of the operations, but because of some details, an estimate was possible (note: those two dates could be incorrect).
The “Boroso” attack took place more than two years ago. While that assault appears to be on a large scale (for example, the Nigerian Army is defending with tanks, although it is later forced to withdraw) and fits the narrative of “epic battles,” it is quite puzzling to see such old footage.
In the attack on Mallam Fatori (the first one), ISWAP militants can be seen firing rockets using a vehicle-mounted launcher. Specifically, the group named them “Katyushas.” The attack database shows that the operations in the area in the last year where ISWAP was claiming to have used Katyusha rockets took place in August 2021.
Another clip that appears to be older is the one from the Kareto-Gubio road. No claims from the last year reported an IED in that area, and the only report that matches the footage is the one from 2020. It is doubtful that this just was not claimed by ISWAP, although a considerable operational decrease along the road should be noted.
Finally, no attack from Chetimari (or nearby areas) matches the footage visible. The most recent operation in the area claimed by ISWAP took place in late January 2022. However, the description does not check what was shown, namely the killed members of the Nigerien security forces or the captured weapons and vehicles.
Only three ISWAP operations took place this year. However, it is not unusual for the Islamic State provinces to use slightly older footage. Therefore, it should not be surprising. On the other hand, the number of claims and different types of attacks in the last couple of weeks begged for more recent clips. The most intriguing part (timewise) are the attacks from 2019 and 2020, which seem slightly out of place. They do not fit any narrative other than “here is a collection of attacks.” In comparison, the previous video in that series had a clear timing theme - the offensive of Spring 2021. In this case, there is nothing like that.
The Iraq-like SVBIED
Perhaps the most interesting part of the video was the footage of the attack on New Marte. The assault itself appeared to be rather ordinary, but the unusual part was an SVBIED used by ISWAP, and there are several reasons for it to be called “unusual.” First, the SVBIED was deployed offensively - i.e., not to stop the attacking military units and their advance, but to assist the ISWAP assault on a target, mainly to breach the security perimeter. Second, the video showed the detonation moment, which the group could claim was a successful mission. Third, this part also used footage from a drone. While we have already seen ISWAP confirm its use of drones (through a photo report from Wulgo), the New Marte attack occurred before releasing those photos.
It appears that ISWAP used the drone mainly to guide the suicide bomber and help him reach his target. It is a tactic that the Islamic State used most often during the Battle of Mosul in 2016-17. However, it is the first time that the group has confirmed the use of drone-assisted SVBIEDs in the Lake Chad Basin. This was most likely not the first time it had used the drones in such a way. Still, one might wonder whether ISWAP also deployed that tactic during the Nigerian Army offensives in Alagarno, Sambisa, and Lake Chad.
Intriguingly, the footage of the exploding SVBIED appeared to have surprised the cameraman. As the official report says (the author was able to obtain it), the car bomb was actually destroyed before reaching its target. Therefore, it did not kill anyone, and that is also why ISWAP did not claim to have killed any specific number of Nigerian soldiers in New Marte. This is another case of claiming total success when, in fact, it did not happen.
The “spies”
Equally interesting is the part showing the men accused of spying on ISWAP on behalf of the Borno State government. It is a four-minute segment that starts with a militant armed with a pistol and a blindfolded man kneeling in front of him. The man is only named “The Agent for the Apostate Nigerian Army.” Curiously, the militant speaks Arabic, but his speech has subtitles added in Hausa. He directly addresses “enemies of Islam” (meaning: the purported spies), accusing them of abandoning the religion after associating themselves with “disbelievers.” He then kills the unnamed “spy” after shooting him in the head.
This is followed by the “interrogation” of three men. In all three cases, it looks the same - the men introduce themselves and say where they are from (all say Mandaragirau, which is located along the Damboa-Biu road). They all add the Borno State Government had given them money to spy on the movement of ISWAP in the area but were soon captured by the “security detachment” of the group. The scene looks similar to those seen previously in Iraq and Syria years ago. The handcuffed men, one after another, are seated at the table in a dark room, with their hands handcuffed. Opposite them, a masked militant listens to their “testimony.”
While the author cannot independently verify this - ISWAP might have tortured them, although it cannot be immediately spotted - it follows the news from August about the militants spreading leaflets in that area. They were warning the residents of Sabon Gari, Nguma, Mandaragirau, and Mandafuma about not informing the military about the group’s movements. It appears that ISWAP decided to abduct those it had accused of spying.
After the “interrogation,” the abductees are moved to the execution site. One of the armed men does the usual “baqiyah” speech, saying the Islamic State will remain, despite “plots and conspiracies,” and the militants will keep an eye on those who want to spy on behalf of the enemy. He and two other armed men then kill the “spies.”
This scene is notable because it is likely the first time (and undoubtedly the first time in years) that ISWAP is showing the execution of people accused of spying. A setting similar to those first witnessed in Iraq and Syria should be understood as the group trying to blame the opponents acting inside the areas of ISWAP‘s presence. As it suffers from further setbacks, it might accuse more people of spying in the future, just like IS did as the territorial caliphate was crumbling.
Conclusion
ISWAP published the “Makers of the Epic Battles” video during a time when it was suffering from the Nigerian Army offensives in Borno State. The group likely wanted to manifest its strength by releasing it. However, the footage shown was not very recent, and some operations depicted took place more than a year earlier. Nonetheless, it confirmed that ISWAP is able to utilize many different tactics, techniques, and procedures. Furthermore, it uses different TTPs first seen in Iraq and Syria, such as drone-assisted SVBIEDs.
On the other hand, ISWAP started blaming the setbacks on the presence of purported “spies.” Doing this admitted that the operations had not been going according to the plan. If the setbacks continue, the group with inevitably double down on the spying accusations, perhaps becoming more violent towards those who live in the areas where it is present.